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Cases relied on by the State to support its position are
inapplicable and distinguishable from the facts of this particular
case.
The introduction of the evidence of the prior sexual
relations with Mr. Rivera was not so prejudicial that it should have
been excluded.

Rather, after balancing the interests, the prejudice

that occurred to Mr. Williams by excluding the evidence requires
reversing the convictions and remanding the case for a new trial.
Mr. Williams was prejudiced by the interjection of his
parole status into the proceedings, and his counsel did not waive
the error by waiting until completion of her cross-examination to
move for a new trial.

The trial court erred when it failed to grant

the mistrial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
(Reply to Respondent's Point I.)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMINE MARIA GALICIA CONCERNING
HER PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY WHICH OCCURRED SAME DAY
AS THE ALLEGED OFFENSE.
The State responds to Mr. Williams' appeal by stating that
sexual promiscuity is not linked to veracity (Brief of Respondent at
18-19 (Citing State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985), and State
v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980)).

Mr. Williams does not

dispute this general proposition and conceded such in his opening
brief (Brief of Appellant at 10 (also citing State v. Johns, 615
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p.2d 1260 (Utah 1980)).

However, in this case, Mr. Williams was not

attempting to establish that the sexual promiscuity of Ms. Galicia
showed that she would not tell the truth; rather, Mr. Williams
wanted the jury to be aware that Ms. Galicia had been involved in a
sexual encounter earlier in the evening.

That encounter could

account for the presence of semen in the anal cavity, and explained
a motive for Ms. Galicia to not be truthful.

It also established

that Ms. Galicia had not been truthful about the existence of that
prior encounter and offered a reason as to why Ms. Galicia might not
be truthful about her encounter with Mr. Williams.

The existence of

the sexual encounter earlier in the evening and Ms. Galiciafs
dishonesty in denying that such an encounter occurred fits within
the exceptions set forth in State v. Johns.

Those exceptions are

discussed in Mr. Williams1 opening brief at Point I, sub-points A,
B, and C and again here briefly in response to the State's answer.
Reliance on State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985) is
misplaced in the instant case because in Lovato, the prior sex act
occurred two full days before the sexual encounter between the
accused and the victim, and the defendant admitted all acts,
contending they were consensual.

Lovato, 702 P.2d at 105.

In

Lovato, evidence of the sexual encounter two days before was not
necessary to explain the presence of semen since the defendant
admitted having intercourse with the victim.

Id.

The present case is distinguished from Lovato since Mr.
Williams denies anal intercourse (R. 814) and denies ejaculating
-3 -

during the vaginal intercourse (R. 804, 493). A factual dispute
therefore exists as to, at the very least, the sodomy count.

In

addition, Ms. Galicia's prior sexual encounter with Mr. Rivera did
not occur two days before but only hours before the encounter with
Mr. Williams.

Hence, Ms. Galicia's prior sexual encounter is

admissible to establish an alternative explanation as to the source
of the semen.
The State's second basis for contention in its brief is
that the introduction of the prior sex act with Mr. Rivera would so
prejudice Ms. Galicia that it should be suppressed (Brief of
Respondent at 19, 23). Such a position is erroneous.

Utah

expressly rejected Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rape
Cases, Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior).

The Advisory Committee

note under Rule 412 of the Utah Rules of Evidence explains that the
federal rule is poorly drafted and, more importantly, that the issue
is better covered by rules 404 and 405 as discussed in State v.
Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975).
The Howard opinion points out that while the evil of
"putting the victim on trial" is an issue which should be "minimized
to whatever extent that can be done consistent with the process of
justice," other countervailing considerations must be balanced.
Howard, 544 P.2d at 469.

In addition, the Court stated:

[T]his accusation [rape; etc. . .] most always
arises from an incident which occurs with only
two parties present. It is one in which it is
-4 -

easy to accuse,but hard to defend against. If
the accused is convicted, the result can be not
only a long prison term, with the resulting
serious effects on a man's life, but the stigma
always remains. Therefore, in serving the ends
of justice and protecting the public interest
it is important that the utmost care be
exercised to protect not only the woman who
claims to have been outraged, but also the man
who is so accused.
Id.

Despite this admonition articulated in Howard, the trial judge

suppressed the prior sexual encounter of Ms. Galicia in part because
of what he considered to be an unwarranted invasion into her private
life (R. 340). The balancing was incomplete, however, as the trial
court neglected the prejudice to Mr. Williams.

Mr. Williams faced

multiple convictions which led to incarceration for periods of five
years to life.

By suppressing the prior act of sexual intercourse

between Ms. Galicia and Mr. Rivera, the trial court forced the jury
to exercise their discretion based on only part of the facts.

The

omission of these facts prejudiced Mr. Williams and may have altered
the outcome because he was unable to present to the jury (a) that
Ms. Galicia had a motive and opportunity to have behaved as Mr.
Williams testified, (b) that Ms. Galicia's story had changed, and
(c) that the presence of semen in the anal cavity could have been
attributed to someone other than Mr. Williams.. Each of these
sub-points was addressed in Mr. Williams' opening brief;

Mr.

Williams now replies to each sub-point of the State's answer.

-5 -

A. THE EVIDENCE OP PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY
WAS ADMISSIBLE TO CORROBORATE MR. WILLIAMS'
THEORY OF THE CASE AND TO REVEAL MS. GALICIA'S
MOTIVES FOR THE ALLEGATIONS.
(Reply to State's sub-point A)
The State argues that Mr. Williams' ability to
cross-examine Ms. Galicia concerning her route home was sufficient
to support Mr. Williams' theory that the pair met on the street
(Brief of Respondent at 19-20).

This evidence alone, however, is

not enough to support Mr. Williams' position.

Without the evidence

of who dropped Ms. Galicia off and why she was dropped off, Mr.
Williams was unable to present her possible motives for approaching
him.

That evidence is critical to his case.

Absent evidence of

those motives, the little cross-examination that was allowed only
damaged Mr. Williams case by allowing an inference that he spotted
her and then followed her to her apartment rather than that she
approached him and invited him home.
Additionally, the State's suggestion that no evidence
exists that Ms. Galicia felt scorned (Brief of Respondent at 20) is
untrue.

Although Ms. Galicia would not admit that she was dropped

off at Mr. Rivera's request (R. 545-46, 589), Mr. Rivera chose the
word "dumped" (R. 544-46, 588-89, 772). That choice of words and
the circumstances allow for this inference to be more than just
speculation as the State contends.

In addition, Ms. Galicia did not

run to the nearby apartment of her close friend, Mr. Rivera, for
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assistance after the incident; instead, she went to a convenience
store several blocks away.

The jury should have been able to hear

the evidence of the encounter between Ms. Galicia and Mr. Rivera and
been allowed to determine whether the evidence supported a motive to
not tell the truth.

As a result of the suppression of evidence of

the sexual encounter between Ms. Galicia and Mr. Rivera, Mr.
Williams was denied the opportunity to present evidence on his
behalf.
Finally, the State asserts that Ms. Galicia's testimony was
consistent and corroborated by the evidence (Brief of Respondent at
23-24).

Two important observations need to be made on this point.

First, Ms. Galicia's testimony when compared with her earlier
statements was not consistent at all.

She first stated she had not

had sex for a long time (R. 504, 549, 672) when, in fact, she had
sex just hours earlier with Mr. Rivera.

She also first indicated to

the convenience store people that she had just been beaten, not
raped (R. 440, 508, 576).
the opening brief.)

(Other inconsistencies are laid out in

Hence, Ms Galicia was not truthful within the

context of the instant case.
Second, while the jury by its verdict found Ms. Galicia's
testimony that she was raped to be truthful and supported by the
evidence, the jury did so without the knowledge of these crucial
inconsistencies in her story.

The jury should have been able to

hear all the evidence and then judge the case and decide based on
all relevant information.

Whether the State believes no logic
-7 -

exists in Mr. Williams story is not the critical question.

The

question is how the jury reacts and sifts through the evidence.
When the trial court suppressed the evidence surrounding Ms.
Galicia's prior sexual activity with Mr. Rivera, the Court usurped
the jury's duty and denied Mr. Williams his right to confront the
witness against him.

B.

THE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY WAS
ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF
MS. GALICIA.
(Reply to State's Sub-point B)

The State cites State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986),
to support its proposition that under Rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidencef Ms. Galicia would have been too prejudiced by the
introduction of the evidence of her prior sexual encounter with Mr.
Rivera (Brief of Respondent at 26-27).

Rammel, however,

demonstrates the inappropriateness of the Statefs position and the
court's reliance on Rule 403 to suppress that evidence.

The

evidence at issue in Rammel and examined under Rule 403 was evidence
offered against the accused,

not the complainant.

It is the

accused who suffers the greater chance of prejudice from evidence;
only the accused suffers the chance of criminal conviction and
imprisonment.

The worst a complainant suffers is injury to

reputation and/or intrusion into otherwise private matters.

Yet, as

indicated earlier, a balancing occurs in these types of cases where
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the only two people who know what occurred are the participants.
For a truly fair and accurate assessment of the case, the jury must
have before it all relevant evidence.

Anything short of that

jeopardizes the integrity of the fact-finding process and ultimately
the system itself.
Rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence indicates that the
rules of evidence should be construed so that "truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined."

Suppressing

otherwise relevant evidence under Rule 403 on the facts in the
instant case does not promote the ascertaining of truth.
Suppressing the evidence of Ms. Galicia's prior sexual encounter
with Mr. Rivera and her falsehoods concerning it improperly balanced
the interests of the complainant over the interests of Mr. Williams
who suffered a

greater prejudice.

Suppressing the evidence

required the jury to make a decision without all the pertinent
facts.

Rule 403 and Rule 102 do not allow such a ruling, and the

trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.

In State v. Branch,

743 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), this Court recently stated:
Rule 403 is not to be used to allow the trial
judge to substitute his assessment of the credibility
of testimony for that of the jury by excluding
testimony simply because he does not find it
credible.
The trial court used that impermissible basis (R. 339-40) and his
ruling was thus in error.

Mr. Williams should be granted a new and

fair trial where all relevant evidence may reach the fact finder.

-9 -

C.

THE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY WAS
ADMISSIBLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF
THE PRESENCE OF SEMINAL FLUID IN THE ANAL
CAVITY.
(Reply to State's Sub-point C)

The State correctly recounts Dr. Stuart's testimony that no
conclusive physical evidence existed as to anal intercourse (Brief
of Respondent at 27. R. at 648). It is precisely because there was
no conclusive evidence of anal intercourse that evidence of Mr.
Rivera's sexual participation with Ms. Galicia is relevant.

The

anal smear revealed the presence of sperm (R. 558) which Dr. Stuart
testified could have drained or dripped from the vagina (R. 648).
Both Mr. Williams and Mr. Rivera admitted vaginal intercourse and
could have been the source of the seminal fluid.
testified he had had a vasectomy;
ejaculate.

Mr. Rivera

Mr. Williams testified he did not

A material issue existed regarding the source of the

semen.
The jury was only allowed to hear that Mr. Williams had
sexual intercourse with Ms. Galicia; they were not aware that a
second party, Mr. Rivera, had been sexually involved with Ms.
Galicia or that for some reason, she had lied about the other sexual
activity.

By suppressing such evidence, the trial court denied

Mr.Williams a fair trial.
The State confuses the issue of the relevance of Mr.
Rivera's sexual relations with Ms. Galicia by claiming that as a
secreter with the same blood system as Ms. Galicia, presence of his
-10-

seminal fluid would have been masked (Brief of Respondent at 28).
While that statement is true, it is also misleading for two
reasons.

First, semen comes only from a male and cannot be masked.

Second, Mr. Williams is a non-secreter and would not have left
anything to mask had he ejaculated (R. 559-60).

Neither man's semen

was detectable yet one of the two deposited the sperm.

The trial

court's handling of the issue denied Mr. Williams a fair trial
because the judge took from the jury the duty to determine which of
the men was responsible for the deposit of semen.

The evidence left

that question open and it should have been resolved by the trier of
fact - the jury - and not by the judge via a pretrial Motion to
Suppress, or the State via argument in its brief.

POINT II.
(Reply to Respondent's Point II)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE
A MISTRIAL AFTER EVIDENCE OF MR. WILLIAMS'
STATUS AS PAROLEE TWICE REACHED THE JURORS.
While the opening brief of Mr. Williams thoroughly covers
this issue, two brief points in response are appropriate.
First, the State contends that defense counsel made a
belated mistrial motion and thereby waived the claim of error that
occurred when Ms.Galicia's son introduced evidence of Mr. Williams'
parole status (Brief of Respondent at 33). The State's claim is
without merit.
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) requires a "timely"
objection or motion.

To be "timely", an objection need not be
-11-

"simultaneous".

Instead, it must be contemporaneously made, giving

the trial court an opportunity to rule and, if possible, correct the
error.
In the present case, a review of the circumstances and
subsequent explanation by defense counsel points out that the motion
was contemporaneous and timely as required (R 690-700).

Based on

the trial court's earlier denial of a similar motion, defense
counsel had reason to believe that the court was not inclined to
grant a motion for mistrial on this ground.

Defense counsel had

good reason to avoid calling additional attention to the word
"parole" by making a simultaneous objection and motion to strike.
Furthermore, the prejudice would have been compounded rather than
alleviated by an order from the court for the jurors to disregard
what they had just heard.
Second, the State suggests that if any error occurred, it
was harmless (Brief of Respondent at 35). Such is not the case.
The jury heard the word parole which unquestionably indicates prior
convictions.

Prior conviction evidence is presumed prejudicial,

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

The jury very

likely assumed the worse and attributed guilt by virtue of that
additional piece of impermissible evidence.
Furthermore, the State does not defend the prosecutor's
failure to properly admonish witnesses.

A pre-trial motion to

suppress all prior conviction evidence was granted by the Court (R.
331-41).

The court repeatedly admonished the jurors to avoid
-12-

publicity likely to disclose that prejudicing information (R. 443/
578, 609) and the prosecution had been instructed to admonish
witnesses to guard against prior conviction evidence reaching the
jury (R. 710-13).

With all the concern and care taken to keep out

the evidence of prior convictions, it is inconsistent to find such
evidence harmless and nonprejudicial when it reaches the jury.

The

Court should have recognized the prejudice it had taken pains to
avoid, and granted the motion for a mistrial.

POINT III.

NO REPLY

POINT IV.

NO REPLY

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, as well as those
articulated in the opening brief, Mr. Williams respectfully requests
that this Court grant his appeal, reverse his convictions, and
remand to the trial court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this [^j
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